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THE WELFARE CRISIS OF CENTRAL AMERICA
DAVID STOESZ, D.S.W
Hood College
ABSTRACT
The crisis of Central America, funda-
mentally due to social injustice, is ex-
acerbated as the Reagan administration
seeks a "military polution" to political
problems of the region. A humane approach
to alleviating the devastating poverty of
Central America necessitates reconciling
two strategies of national development: a
techno-economic strategy and a socio-
political strategy. Both strategies leave
important issues unresolved. The prospect
of improving conditions for the people of
Central America-diminishes as the region is
increasingly militarized.
INTRODUCTION
With the ascendance of a leftist junta
in Nicaragua, the protraction of a relent-
less civil war in El Salvador, and the pro-
gressive destabilization of other Central
American governments (Neirer, 1983: 35-45),
the United States faces a crisis in Latin
foreign relations not seen since the Cuban
Revolution. The conservative interpreta-
tion of these events is that they represent
a threat to the security of the United
States. As former Secretary of State,
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Alexander Haig has characterized these
developments,
What is at stake is the radicalization
of the Western Hemisphere by foreign
powers and by interests that are being
manipulated from Moscow through Cuba.
Now we face the prospect of having the
first Central American totalitarian
Marxist regime in Nicaragua and the
threat of its expansion into El
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and
Colombia (1981: 34).
Before becoming chief United States
delegate to the United Nations, Jeane
Kirkpatrick suggested that the United
States offer "money, arms, logistical
supplies, and the services of, counter-
insurgency experts" to frail governments
threatened by "the unfamiliar guerrilla
violence of revolutionaries linked to Cuba
by ideology, training and the need for
support, and through Cuba to the Soviet
Union: (1981: 34). In search of a
"military solution" to the Central American
conundrum, the Reagan administration has
proposed increasing "security aid' to El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala from
$216.8 million for FY 1983 to $335 million
for FY 1984 (Knickerbocker, 1983: 1).
Efforts to forge a military solution
have eclipsed those to negotiate a "polit-
ical solution," a strategy most clearly
articulated by the Carter administration.
That administration's human rights policy
focused on the poor socio-economic cond-
itions of the indigenous populations and
government oppression of intellectuals that
would speak on their behalf. According to
this analysis, Latin difficulties
stem from decades of repression in a
social structure in which a small
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number of families, protected by a
succession of military governments,
have controlled the vast bulk of the
nation's land and wealth, paying a
pittance to peasant workers who have
little or no voice in determining
their own fates (Meislin, 1983: 54).
Such conditions contribute to violence
by excluding the disadvantaged from the
political and economic process. Accord-
ingly, liberals argue for reforms, commonly
through elections and land reform, to amel-
iorate social and economic injustice.
During the Carter administration, Latin
governments unwilling to cooperate by
introducing reforms were reprimanded, an
important component of the human rights
policy.
This transition in the position of the
United States position toward Central
America has dramatically worsened the
already marginal condition of the indig-
enous populations there. Foreign policy
preoccupied with the security of the United
States has effectively contributed to an
escalation in the number of refugees
leaving their native countries. By late
1982, the State Department estimated that
between 100,000 and 135,000 refugees had
sought haven in another Central American
nation, and that between 250,000 and
500,000 Central Americans had entered the
United States illegally. These figures do
not include the hundreds of thousands who
have been forced to resettle within their
native country (Riding, 1983: 12). "Over
100,000 have lost their lives in three
small and ill-fated countries of Central
America: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Guatemala," wrote Nobel prize author
Gabriel Garcia Marquez. "If this had
happened in the United States, the cor-
responding figures would be that of
1,600,000 violent deaths in four years"
(1983: 17). Most profoundly, United States
foreign policy has been detrimental to the
social welfare of millions of Central
Americans. By interpreting the instability
of Central America as a security issue,
rather than a welfare issue, the Reagan
administration has pushed the entire region
close to the abyss.
The problem of Central America is
fundamentally one of national development.
As a problem in nation-building the region
presents issues that are more complex than
simplistic saber-rattling. The purpose of
this work is to elaborate some of these
issues in the hope that a more informed,
and humane, foreign policy may be
developed.
THE SOLITUDE OF CENTRAL AMERICA (1)
A basic education in the social reality
of Central America is provided by des-
criptive statistics on nations of the
region. Typically, the per capita GNP is
less than $1,000; as it is for El Salvador
($660), Colombia ($850), and Guatemala
($910). Yet, economic indicators only tell
part of the story. Of these three coun-
tries, only Colombia provides enough
nutrition for its people. The per capita
daily calorie supply as a percent of
requirements is 102 for Colombia, 98 for
Guatemala, and only 90 for El Salvador
(Nossiter, 1980:E3). Yet, even Colombia,
well-fed by Central American standards,
loses 30,000 children each year to
malnutrition (Zeitlin, 1972:13-14).
The great majority of Colombians,
whether in rural or urban areas suffer
from hunger and malnutrition, and the
pain of infectious diseases. Dys-
entery is endemic throughout the
country, as is anemia, scurvy, pel-
lagra, intestinal parasitism, and
other sickness . . . The poor suffer
from nearly universal protein
deficiency . . . The average life
expectancy at birth for the population
as a whole is only forty-six years,
and is therefore, even less among the
most exploited (Blutstein, 1977:105).
In an important analysis of infant
mortality, the Pan American Health Organ-
ization concluded that malnutrition
contributed to 34 percent of infant deaths
in Latin America. When deaths related to
malnutrition of the-mother was included,
"well over half" of infant deaths were
associated with malnutrition (Newland,
1981:20). When lack of education is
introduced into the analysis, Kathy Newland
of the Worldwatch Institute, has shown that
the infant mortality rate skyrockets.
Child's Probability of Dying Before
Age Two According to Education,
Selected Central American Countries,
1966-70 (2)
Country Total None 2=1 4-6_ 7-9 if+
(deaths per thousand live births)
Colombia 88 126 95 63 42 32
El Salvador 145 158 142 111 58 30
Guatemala 149 169 135 85 58 44
It is the interaction of variables --
poverty, sickness, and ignorance -- and
their affect on the vitality of a people
over generations that has led Garcia
Marquez to write of the solitude of Latin
America, a region whose people tradi-
tionally have had but one choice --
resignation to their squallor.
TECHNO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3
The initial approach to problems that
were beyond the capacity of any one country
to solve was to provide foreign aid for the
purpose of industrialization. Once an
industrial foundation was established, this
sector could be taxed in order to provide
for the social needs of at-risk
populations. Since this strategy was based
on infusions of technology and capital into
developing nations, it could be called
"techno-economic development".
The techno-economic developmental app-
roach suggests that social welfare expands
commensurate with industrialization. As
Robert Heilbroner has stated, "the eco-
nomics of development is essentially the
economics of capital accumulation"
(1963:118). Ideally ,capital is formed by
exporting raw materials in exchange for
technologies allowing the development of a
sound industrial sector, which, in turn,
provide an adequate tax base for supporting
social welfare programs. Necessarily,
social welfare programs begin in metro-
politan areas containing modern indus-
tries. It is assumed that social welfare
programs will not reach rural populations
until agriculture is modernized, or until
the peasants migrate to the cities. The
scarcity of resources justifies the
restriction of social welfare programs to
industrial rather than rural settings.
Once industrialization occurs and social
welfare programs serve most of the
population, the welfare state would be
altered through the democratic political
process. Proponents of this approach
caution that the prolonged transition from
agricultural society to industrial nation-
state requires a centralized government
authority for planning and national sec-
urity. The latter is particularly impor-
tant because of the need to create a stable
economy which appeals to investors, at the
same time controlling dissident populations
who seek immediate benefits. At times
political instability so jeopardizes econ-
omic development that civilian government
succumbs to military rule. Yet, the sub-
ordination of the democratic political
process to the imperatives of economic
development is defended on the grounds that
it is a temporary measure.
An example of techno-economic devel-
opment can be found in Colombia, which
modeled its welfare state after the United
States. In 1946 the Colombian Social
Security Institute was created to provide
Health insurance, maternity benefits,
family assistance, and disability and old-
age pensions to private sector workers in
five major metropolitan areas. A separate
Office of Social Security provides similar
benefits to public employees. In both
cases, contributions of the worker, the
employer, and the government finance the
benefits. These social insurance programs
are targeted for industrialized areas where
participation is compulsory (Acosta,
1976:228-229). However, agriculture, domes-
tic and temporary workers receive few
benefits (Blutstein:195). Even for those
entitled, benefits are meager. In 1973,
the typical social security payment per
child was $1.61 per month.
In 1968, an Institute for Family
Welfare was created to protect children and
preserve family stability. By the mid-
1970s, this institute administered day care
services for 13,500 children of the 5
million children needing day care. The
Institute could provide family planning
services to only 20,000 families. Pro-
tective services could care for only one
out of every seven abandoned children
(Acosta:232-234). Like social security
benefits, most family services cover
metropolitan populations. Many of these
programs were financed by the Alliance for
Progress, 1960-1974, during which Colombia
received $1.5 billion from the United
States. Alliance for Progress programs
attempted to reform the agrarian sector,
increase the tax base, assist small
farmers, reduce illiteracy, and mprove
health care. By the mid 1970s, aid from
the United States was curtailed when few of
the Alliance for Progress objectives had
been met (Blutstein:207,320-322).
The most recent illustration of the
techno-economic development strategy is the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, proposed by
President Reagan early in 1982. As
initially conceived the policy consisted of
six elements: (1) exports from the Basin
would receive duty-free treatment for
twelve years, (2) significant tax incen-
tives would be provided for businesses
willing to invest in the area, (3) a $350
million appropriation for Basins econom-
ically hard-hit, (4) provision of "tech-
nical assistance and training to assist the
private sector" in the Basin countries, (5)
coordination of efforts involving Mexico,
Canada and Venezuela, and (6) special
measures to aid Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands (1982:A12). By 1983, the
administration sought an appropriation of
$461 million for the Caribbean Basin
Initiative for FY 1984 (Weinraub, 1983:Dl).
Techno-economic developmental theory
assumes moderated social change through
political pluralism under conditions of
economic stability and security maintained
-A7-
by the central government. If benefits and
services are inadequate, it is assumed that
more resources and technology are
necessary, but not that the social struc-
ture is at fault. Writing of social
welfare in the Third World, S. K. Khinduka
has called this developmental approach "a
philosophy of gradualism, of modernization
without tears. The plea to go slow and to
eschew violence to tradition is in essence
a plea to uphold the status quo," he
observed prophetically. "What the Third
World needs most is rapid and radical
change in its social structure" (1971:65).
SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
The inability of-nations to provide for
the basic needs of the majority of their
population, despite funds from the Alliance
for Progress, prompted a critique of the
dependence on industrialized capitalist
nations, particularly the United States.
Dissatisfaction with the primacy of techno-
economic considerations in accelerating
development emerged gradually. The gener-
osity of the United States' Alliance for
Progress became suspect in light of the
fact that almost all of the monies
consisted of loans (Blutstein:321), the
debt service for which soon began to
consume, in the case of Colombia, a fifth
or more of the nation's total foreign
exchange earnings (Zeitlin:p.31). The
teachings of the Brazilian, Paulo Freire,
raised profound questions about the
influence of development on the masses in
Latin America.
It is essential not confuse modern-
ization with development. The former,
although it may affect certain groups
in the "satellite society," is almost
always induced; and it is the
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metropolitan society which derives the
true benefits therefrom. A society
which is merely modernized without
developing will continue--even if it
takes over some minimal delegated
powers of decision--to depend on the
outside country (1970:160).
By the 1970s this critique had grown
into an intellectual movement in Latin
America, leading an analyst from the
conservative Hoover Institution to despair
that
dependency explanations, which place
most of the blame for Latin America's
backwardness on U. S. economic
interests are no longer confined to
academic sanctuaries; they are now the
common currency of a growing body of
generals, bishops, editors, chiefs of
state, even Latin American businessmen
(Falcoff, 1980:797).
A bench mark in the evolution of
dependency theory is the life of Camilo
Torres. A Colombian, Torres received his
clerical education in Belgium where he
learned that the church can be a socially
relevant institution. After his return to
Colombia in 1958, he co-founded the soci-
ology Department of the National University
of Bogota. In 1965, Torres left the
University and the priesthood to join the
guerrilla movement, explaining that armed
insurrection was a valid method of social
change.
The Revolution is the means of ob-
taining a government that will feed
the hungry, clothe the naked, teach
the uneducated, perform works of
charity, love their neighbors not only
in a transitory and occasional way,
not just a few but the majority of
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their neighbors. For this reason the
Revolution is not only permissible but
obligatory for Christians who see in
it the one effective and complete way
to create love for all (Zeitlin: p.
31).
Torres' death in a skirmish with an
army patrol galvanized Latin religious
leaders to press for structural change
(Levine, 1980:26-27).
In 1968, the second General conference
of Latin American Bishops was held in
Medellin, Colombia, where radicalized
clergy argued that overt political activity
is legitimate religious activity. They
called for a Theology of Liberation to
rectify the abuses- of an increasingly
unjust society. Liberation theology com-
bined Christian morality with Marxism by
redefining sin as not a result of personal
failure but of "entire social systems whose
injustice, oppression, and institutional-
ized violence . imposed social
conditions which made" a fully moral and
decent life impossible" (Levine:24).
Following the lead established by
proponents of Liberation Theology, social
scientists (Fals-Borda, 1980) and social
workers have begun to formulate a normative
theory of social change from the critique
of techno-economic development provided by
dependency theory. The focus of this
emerging socio-political developmental
strategy is on organizing indigenous
populations around self-help programs pro-
moting literacy, health, and productivity,
while politically challenging the social
structure. .Josefina Acosta, Director of
Social Work at the National University in
Bogota, has applied the tenets of social
development theory to social welfare; the
result is an emphasis on structural social
change. "For centuries Latin America has
been exploited," Acosta contends. "The
rich do not have the will to improve the
condition of the poor, so the poor have to
fight. The only way is to change the
social order -- the social structure"
(Acosta:1980).
Acosta and here associates assert that
techno-economic development functions to
keep Central American and other Third World
nations in a permanent state of back-
wardness. According to them, techno-
economic developmental theory functions as
an ideology that justifies the exploitive
practices of oligarchical elites which are
dependent on foreign corporations. With
the aid of the oligarchy, foreign corp-
orations can take advantage of low wages so
that profits usually go to the United
States. According to Theotonio dos Santos,
"the dominant countries have a tech-
nological, commercial, capital resource,
and social-political predominance over the
dependent countries . . . This permits them
to impose conditions of exploitation and to
extract part of the domestically produced
surplus" (1972:31). This collusion between
profiteering corporations and the national
oligarchies, claim critics of techno-
economic development, make Central American
nations "de facto colonies" of indus-
trialized capitalist nations (Johnson:73).
The solution to the problem of
dependency, as a consequence of techno-
economic development, has been to recaste
the concept of development entirely,
emphasizing socio-political development.
Social welfare experts in Latin America
reconceptualized social change and anchored
it to the social reality of the oppressed
masses (Alonso, 1971:31). Notable contri-
butions were made by Rosa Perla Resnick
who, following Freire's concept of
"conscientization," suggested that social
welfare be "indigenized" so that, "social
work would serve as a tool for liberation,
for Social development and for social
change." (4) Idealism notwithstanding,
social workers who accept social
development face a quandry because the
theory requires action outside of, or
against, the social structure. Subversive
activity has gained currency as a viable
strategy, with some social workers becoming
involved in "guerrilla welfare," the
provision of necessary goods and services
to neglected populations by political
insurgents. Explains Acosta, "some social
workers have joined the guerrillas, as have
some doctors and lawyers. We, as social
workers, have to take more radical
positions than the -traditional political
parties. Reality dictates that" (1980).
Proponents of socio-political develop-
ment characterize life in the Third World
as a caldron of violence -- the everyday
suffering of the masses interrupted only by
incidents of police repression when the
poor become politically active. As
Bodenheimer observes, the socio-political
developmental model "is inherently a
conflict model on both the international
and domestic levels" (Bodenheimer, p. 39).
This theory derives its premise from
marxian economics which states the
necessity of mature capitalist economies to
obtain inexpensive labor and raw materials
through a variety of imperialistic tactics
(Magdoff:1969). The pervasive social
problems of Third World nations, then are
correctly attributed to the influence of
foreign capital and the intermediary
function of a small oligarchical class. A
culture of dependence is deliberately
maintained because it allows these wealthy
"clientele social classes" (Bodenheimer,
34-39) to amass sizeable fortunes while
convincing the impoverished masses of the
gradual nature of progress. Government is
seen as a legitimizing device at the dis-
posal of the oligarchical elite. Govern-
mental social welfare programs are symbolic
gestures to appease the masses; of
necessity social welfare benefits are
meager and cover only that part of the
population which is economically most
important. The conspicuous display of
military force in all aspects of daily life
is a constant reminder of governmental
domination. Socio-political developmental
theorists use overtly political strategies
in their practices, encouraging peasants to
inherit not the earth, but the government.
Their ultimate objective is the creation of
a society where economic democracy and
political democracy are joined to make
social welfare institutions characteristic
of the capitalistic welfare state
unnecessary.
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
The debate over which of these
strategies of national development is best
has generated several issues. It is
probably the willingness of a party to
consider these seriously that is the best
antidote for jingoistic policies.
(1) A primary question is whether or
not economic loans to Central American
nations can be expected to stimulate
development. In an empirical analysis of
economic assistance to less-developed
countries (LDCs), Ehsan Hikbakht concluded
that, "capital in the form of external
loans has not played its expected role as
the 'engine of growth' in the case of
borrowing LDCs in the period of 1963 to
1979" (1982:194). The recent Mexican
economic crisis suggests that borrowing of
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capital can be disruptive to a developing
economy.
(2) A related question is whether or
not economic assistance from non-
capitalistic nations is less dependency
inducing than has been alleged about the
United States. In 1980, for example, the
largest recipient of Soviet foreign aid was
Cuba, in an amount "equivalent to about 25
percent of the country's gross domestic
product" (N.Y. Times:1983,7). Economic
assistance of this magnitude suggest
dependency.
(3) If the conventional understanding
of development presupposes external aid,
raising the risk Qf dependency, is an
alternative paradigm conceivable? The
alternative of forgoing industrialization
in favor of a less technologically sophis-
ticated, materialistic, and consumption-
oriented economy could be a solution to the
problem (Stokes:1981). However, advocates
of more modest development have difficulty
identifying a nation in which a.) the
imperialistic tendencies of international
capitalism and communism have not distorted
the political process, or b.) materialism
and technological dependence that accompany
industrialism have not deformed the popular
culture. "modernization," Peter Berger
observes, "operates like a gigantic steel
hammer, smashing both traditional insti-
tutions and traditional structures of
meaning" (Berger:23).
(4) Should LDCs, including Central
American nations, agree on a more relevant
agenda for development, could the indus-
trialized nations engage in a meaningful
dialogue with them? The movement by non-
aligned, less industrialized nations, is
such an initiative, often referred to as
the "North-South dialogue." The Cancun
Summit, however, revealed an unwillingness
by industrialized nations, most particu-
larly the United States, to consider
significant alterations in the present
concentrations of capital and technology
(Gardner, 1981:E21). As yet this movement
has not produced a replicable model of
national development which suits the
conditions of the Third World.
(5) Regardless of developmental
strategy, is massive violence an expectable
consequence of social change efforts? In
various Third World nations advocates of
structural reform have been decimated.
Examples such as the recent nulification of
democratic elections by the Bolivian
military (Hoge, 1980:E5), the thousands of
people who have "disappeared" under the
military dictatorship ruling Argentina
(Hoeffel:1979), emergence of right-wing
murder squads in Guatemala (Riding,
1981:E3), and the murders of four
missionaries and two land reform consul-
tants from the United States in El
Salvador, suggest that social agitation is
extremely hazardous during the struggle to
create a just society. One study of Latin
Clerics documented the cases of "36 priests
killed, 46 tortured, 245 exiled or
expelled, and 485 arrested or imprisoned
during 1968-1978 (DeYoung, 1981:26-36, 45-
48). Casualties among the indigenous
population are often under-reported, if
they are reported at all.
Answers to these questions in relation
to the major orientations for national
development -- techno-economic and socio-
political -- are apt to result in a more
informed and sophisticated appreciation of
problems present in Central America.
CONCLUSION
The problems of Central America are
fundamentally problems of social welfare.
The intransigence of the current admini-
stration in describing the issue as one of
national security increases the likelihood
of escalating already intolerable levels of
violence. As justification for seeking a
$110 million increase in military aid for
El Salvador, President Reagan offered this
explanation:
The problem is that an aggressive
minority has thrown in its lot with
the communists, looking to the Soviets
and their Cuban henchmen to help them
pursue political change through
violence. Nicaragua has become their
base. These extremists make no secret
of their goal. The preach the
doctrine of "revolution without
frontiers" (1983:A13).
Such statements reflect an inability to
grapple with discrete problems of the
nations of Central America. In so doing
the administration is effectively region-
alizing the conflict. Further, the already
limited capacity for civilian authorities
to solve domestic problems is being
sabotaged. These developments increase the
likelihood of repeating the mass executions
that have periodically ravaged Central
America. During a three day period in
January 1932, for example, the army of El
Salvador murdered 15,000 to 20,000
capsio, after some of them advocated
agrarian reform (White, 1973:100-101).
More recently, between 100,000 and 300,000
deaths resulted during rural strife, L&
violencj&, in Colombia during the late
1940s and 1950s (Blutstein:3).
An alternative to this is to develop a
foreign policy vis-a-vis the social welfare
needs of Central America in order to
fashion a social reality for its people
founded on principles of social justice.
This necessity has been stated elegantly by
Carlos Fuentes, a Mexican novelist and
diplomat.
The basic dilemma of our nations, far
beyond ideological nit-picking and
strategic posturing, is this demand
that we choose: between, the respect
due to a man's hands, a woman's sex or
a child's eyes; or barbarism and the
brutality that humiliates, tortures
and then murders us all (1981:C.).
NOTES
The author expresses appreciation to
Josefina Acosta of the National University
in Bogota and Rosa Perla Resnick of Hunter
College for their assistance in preparing
this manuscript.
(1) For an impressionistic account of the
social reality of Latin America, see
Marquez' classic, Q n
ittLda (New York: Avon, 1971).
(2) Kathleen Newland, Mor i n
ieaH !th of SocietieHa (1981:28), By con-
trast, the infant mortality rate for the
U.S. is 13 deaths per thousand live births.
(3) The terms techno-economic development
socio-political development are equivalent
to Peter Berger's dichotomy of modern-
ization theory and revolutionary theory,
respectively (see esp. Peter Berger,
Pyramids of Sacrifice (Garden City, N.Y.:
Anchor Books, 1974,) Ch. I.). In an
earlier article Susanne Bodenheimer dis-
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tinguishes between a developmental model
and a dependency model (Susanne
Bodenheimer, The Ideology of Development-
alism (Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE, 1971).
Bodenheimer's thesis that the developmental
model induces dependency is followed in
this paper. However, what she labels as a
dependency model, I have elected to call a
socio-political developmental theory to be
consistent with conventional usage in the
social welfare literature. Socio-political
developmental theory is a logical conse-
quence of applying the dependency model to
techno-economic developmental theory.
(4) Rosa Perla Resnick, "The Indigeniza-
tion of Social Work Around the World: The
Reconceptualization Movement in Latin
America," a paper presented at the 22nd
Annual i Program Meeting bf the Council on
Social Work Education, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, February 1976, p. 8. See
also, Rosa Perla Resnick, "Conscientiza-
tion: An Indigenous Approach to Inter-
national Social Work," International Social
Work 19 (1976): 21-29; and Rosa Perla
Resnick, "Social Work Education in Latin
American and the United States: A Look at
the Future," Journal of Education for
Social Work 16 (1980).
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